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in this paper i aim at highlighting the role touch plays in comparison to other sensory 
modalities both in our apprehension of reality and in the development of our bodily self-
awareness. i will try to discuss above all the latter topic by showing that touch enjoys 
an unique status among the senses because of the coincidence between its bodily organ 
– the flesh – and its material sensory medium. For this essential link with the whole living 
organism touch ensures at the highest degree our anchorage to the world and exerts an 
epistemological supremacy since its cognitive performances contribute to establishing 
a robust sense of reality, by confronting ourselves with the resistance opposed by the 
things. in its essential connection with proprioception, kinesthesia and bodily feelings 
tactile perception constitutes the bodily intentionality in its basic form and therefore 
assures the mutual interplay between different sensory modalities. another exclusive 
feature of tactile perception consists in its double function as proprioceptive and 
exteroceptive direction, as shown by the unique phenomenon of touchant/touché. husserl 
and merleau-Ponty have devoted their attention to the relevance of this experience in 
generating the bodily self-awareness in its reflexive structure.
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in spite of the fact that in our philosophical tradition the sense of sight 
has exerted an indisputable supremacy in comparison with other sensory 
modalities, it is true that touch plays a key role both in our apprehension of 
reality and above all in the development of our bodily self-awareness. From 
Plato to enlightenment the vast majority of philosophers has unilaterally 
placed the accent on sight by stressing its privileged status as the true im-
age of intellect (Roth 2012, 43). This fact finds confirmation in the worship of 
visual image among all expressive forms that pervades our culture almost 
in its totality. in On the Soul Aristotle arranges the five senses according to 
a hierarchy that culminates with sight and has at its bottom touch as com-
promised with the most “fleshly” components of the sensitive soul, whereas 
sight anticipates the high-order performances of intellect. nowadays this 
tendency is mirrored in the mainstream attitude of anglophone philosophy 
of mind which conceives sight as the epistemological sense par excellence 
and proposes an approach to sensory experience modelled on the role of 
perceiver as a passive spectator. beside of this the distal property of visual 
perception and its relative independence from the bodily conditions allow 
the separation between the external world and the experiencing subject 
(ratcliffe 2010, 134). as we shall see in the course of our exposition, it is dif-
ficult to trace such a sharp boundary line, as shown by the phenomenon of 
the reversibility between passive and active touch.
the little consideration given to tactility is not enough to play down its 
essential function in our bodily experience and the complexity of its physi-
ological constitution. Unlike the other sensory modalities, touch requires 
not a single organ, but a huge amount of mechanoreceptors that are strewn 
across the whole body surface. the intracorporeal ubiquity of touch has its 
counterpart in the fact that it goes together with almost all our interactions 
with the external objects and the other people. the correspondence relation 
between the body and its environment refers to a functional duplicity which 
distinguishes touch from the other senses. on the one hand touch as extero-
ceptive sense is outward oriented since it turns to the objects of the external 
world in their material features, on the other as interoceptive sense it refers 
to the body itself and its states. in this latter function touch generates the 
bodily self-awareness in its self-reflexive structure, whereas this property 
is not to be understood as a higher-order cognitive performance which 
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involves a fully developed self-consciousness, but in the narrow sense of a 
pure sensory self-referring without need of abstract representations (roth 
2012, 48).
despite the low-ranking position it occupies in his hierarchy aristotle him-
self admits that touch is the most basilar sense because of its necessity for 
the survival of animal organisms. tact has priority compared with other 
senses not only as a possibility condition and a general model for them, but 
also from a phylogenetic point of view, because it is common to all animals, 
including the less evolved ones (aristotle, de an., 434 b 20-24). however touch 
owes its exceptional status to the fact that it does not satisfy the require-
ment of the distinction between bodily organ and material sensory medium 
to which the other senses are subject (Paterson 2007, 4-5). The flesh and the 
whole body are at the same time the medium and the organ of touch so that 
the apprehension of a tactile quality like dryness can involve both the bod-
ily sensation of dehydration and the perception of an objective feature (e.g. 
a dry leave). in general terms aristotle’s concept of aisthesis is strictly cor-
related with the sensing body since it includes both physiological aspects 
like affects and bodily sensations and psychological ones – the perception 
as high-order activity whose task consists in processing the raw data pro-
vided by sensations. the embodied nature of aisthesis is already mirrored in 
its definition as the capacity of an organism to be moved or affected by an 
external object. this alteration is not to be drawn back to the activity of the 
objects as such, but it depends on the specific way of alteration the sense 
faculty undergoes (Paterson 2001, 17-20).
For its essential connection with the living organism touch is among all 
sensory modalities the one that ensures at the highest degree our anchor-
age to the world. touch deserves an epistemological supremacy because its 
cognitive performances are indispensable for the development of our sense 
of reality. nothing attests in so pregnant a way the existence of an external 
world and of our body than the impacts the environment exerts upon our 
tactile receptivity. touch is the less deceptive sense since it corrects the 
perceptual illusions generated by the sight and allows us to recognize the 
constancy of shape, size and superficial structure of the objects, despite the 
modifications these features can undergo in visual perception. The primacy 
of touch and its chronological precedence are confirmed in the ontogenetic 
development of humans too. though the exploratory active touch is not yet 
developed in newborns and infants, the tactile impressions yielded by the 
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mouth are enough to communicate them a robust sense of reality and play a 
fundamental role in nutrition (Katz 1925, 240-241).
touch competes with sight in apprehending the spatial relations and the 
objective features of the external world and exhibits therefore a functional 
kinship with it. However the narrowness of its perceptual field and its 
proximal range, which depend on the fact that tactile sensations occur only 
through contact of objects on the cutaneous surface, have led several psy-
chologists to consider touch as an auxiliary sensory modality subordinated 
to sight (hatwell 2003, 1). to be sure, the reasons for this negative appraisal 
are to be traced back on the one hand to the insistence on the performance 
disparity between touch and sight, on the other to the propensity to treat 
both as separate and incommunicable sensory modalities. it is rather nec-
essary to consider touch and sight in their mutual interplay and in their 
common rootedness in the motor capacities of the body. e. Straus (1956) and 
d. Katz (1925, 79-80) have insisted on the unnatural character of a clear-cut 
distinction between perception and movement since it splits at the level of 
reflective consideration what is inextricably united in sensory experience. 
having neglected movement as basic condition for perception is a conse-
quence of the atomistic approach of empirical psychology, which devotes its 
attention to punctual and motionless stimuli. both sight and touch involve 
exploratory bodily movements in order to grasp the objects in the full-
fledged richness of their spatial and qualitative features. If I want to gain a 
complete and veridical percept of any object it does not suffice that I lay my 
hand on it, but I must slide the tips of my fingers along its surface and con-
tours. in the same way the visual apprehension of the object in its manifold 
sides requires that i turn my head toward it and execute exploratory move-
ments with my ocular bulbs. J. J. gibson (1962, 477) has carried the analogy 
between the exploratory functions of sight and touch so far that he speaks 
of a “tactile scanning” which allows active touch to integrate vision – and to 
surrogate it in blind people. conversely noë (2004, 72-73) refers to merlau-
Ponty’s “palpation with the eyes” in order to stress the common sensorimo-
tor constitution of both vision and touch.
Perception is then from its very beginning an eminently motor activity. the 
spatiality of perceived world and the experience of the localisation of the 
objects according to the perspective that radiates from the zero-point of 
the body are possible only for a being capable of moving in its environment. 
Kinaesthesia – understood in a broader sense as the direct awareness of my 
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bodily movements – constitutes the spatiality of both the sensing body and 
the perceived object. thanks to the bodily movements the manifold sensory 
appearances are synthesised along an unitary perceptual process and recog-
nized in their belonging to the same and the one thing. hence the motivat-
ing character of kinaesthesia, on which depend both sight and touch as well 
as the coordination between their sensory schemata (mattens 2009, 100). ac-
cording to the late husserl (1954, 106) and merleau-Ponty (1945, 112 ss.) the 
kinaesthetic system coincides with the lived body as common power of mo-
tion and sensation since it gives rise to a background of sensorial receptivity 
that makes possible for every object to be perceived and constitutes there-
fore intentionality in its most basic form. the call to the essential role of 
the whole body in grounding perception and action counts for both husserl 
and merleau-Ponty as a vindication of the true nature of sensory experience 
against the empirical atomism which reduces it to the functioning of segre-
gated sensory organs. merleau-Ponty’s refusal of the notion of sensory quale 
as the sole object of perception entails a radical rejection of the traditional 
distinction between proper and common senses introduced by aristotle as 
well as the one between primary and secondary sensory qualities. We are 
able to apprehend material features as the texture of a colour or the fragility 
of a crystal glass only through the integration of different sensory modali-
ties (moran 2010, 183-184).
the kinaesthetic system exploits the resources provided by sight, touch and 
proprioception in order to coordinate the position of limbs with the objects 
in the environment during the execution of explorative movements. From 
a phenomenological point of view it is very difficult to disentangle these 
aspects, since the dimension of tactility is coextensive with the kinaesthetic 
background of our embodied experience and involves the contribution of 
proprioception (ratcliffe 2008, 302). during the tactile perception of any 
object i am at the same time aware of myself as a sensitive and mobile body 
because every touch experience is both proprioceptive and exteroceptive 
(bermùdez 1998, 137) so that it can ground the distinction between self and 
non-self as well their intrinsic relationship. the holistic character of the 
lived body as common sensible involves the interplay between tactility and 
other bodily sensations like proprioception, kinaesthesia and vestibular 
sense. the intimate relation these sensory modalities entertain with each 
other has led some authors to include touch under the general heading of 
“somatosensation” (Serino and haggard 2010, 224) or to highlight the con-
nection between tactual perception and somatic sensations, conceived 
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respectively as the transitive and intransitive form of bodily perception 
(armstrong 1962, 20). in a similar way gibson (1962, 478-479) distinguishes in 
information flow carried by active touch an exterospecific and a propriospe-
cific component whereas the latter one – called “somaesthesia” – covers the 
broad spectrum of bodily sensation.
if sight prevails over touch as regards the constitution of material objectiv-
ity, touch and bodily sensations enjoy a privileged rank for their peculiar 
role in generating bodily self-awareness, since they allow the emergence of 
the lived body. both passive and active touch involve a subjective component 
oriented toward the body and this applies also to the tactile experiences 
that seem to concern only objective features. Thanks to a modification of 
the subjective attitude it is possible to point out in them a qualitative aspect 
localized in body that offers itself in intuitive evidence and is not merely 
the product of an indirect inference. the emergence of either the subjective 
or the objective pole in tactile phenomena depends on the specific bodily 
localisation: in body parts that are not involved in thing-related tactile per-
ception the subjective aspect prevails, while the objective one comes into 
prominence when the touch organ is moved (Katz 1925, 41). this attention 
shift from the objective aspects of tactile perception to the subjective ones 
involves the own body too, as shown by the phenomenon of touchant/touché 
which finds its paradigmatic expression in the example of both hands touch-
ing with each other cited by husserl and merleau-Ponty.
When i touch with my right hand the left one, the touching hand becomes 
the bearer of presenting tactile sensations, whose function consists in pre-
senting the touched hand – and thus my body – as an objective thing with its 
material features, like skin texture, smoothness, softness and so on. When 
instead I turn my attention to the touched hand, I can notice that a field of 
localised tactile sensations (“sensings” in husserl’s terminology) spreads 
over its surface. these sensations are fundamentally different from the ones 
that have presenting function, because they do not give rise to a manifold 
of perceptual adumbrations like object perceptions, but let manifest to 
itself the whole lived body in its own sensibility. thus sensings transmit 
the experiential quality of bodily ownership that enables me to recognize 
immediately and without further verifications my hand as my hand. Be-
side of this sensings unfold an intracorporeal space which constitutes the 
ground for the tactile construction of the external objective space through 
the exercise of kinaesthetic sensations in their motivating function. both 
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kinaesthetic and presenting sensations are localised in the body and de-
pend on the sensings, which ground the mutual belonging of the different 
sensorial fields and of the corresponding systems of voluntary movement 
(mattens 2009, 104-105). thanks to the property of reversibility exhibited 
by the double touch the body can act simultaneously as constitutive subject 
and constituted object. this feature is absent in other sensory modalities as 
sight and hearing. Sight can constitute the real objectivity and therefore my 
body as material thing at the level of body image but can constitute neither 
its own sensory organ as such nor the whole body as touch does, especially 
since there are body parts like my backs and my face that cannot fall within 
my visual field. It is only through a mirror that I can attribute to my eyes the 
perceptual function they play by making use of the sole resources of sight. 
in other words, i cannot see my eyes seeing in the same way i can touch my 
hands touching each with other. i know that i see through my eyes not on 
the grounds of the perceptual data provided by vision but through the local-
ized tactile sensation of my eyes and the corresponding kinaesthesias which 
come into play when i move them in order to explore the environment (hus-
serl 1952, 152-159).
according to merleau-Ponty (1945, 105-107) instead, my body is prevented to 
be an object because it is not completely constituted neither through sight 
nor through touch. the phenomenon of double touch reveals the difference 
between the touching hand and the touched one, insofar the latter shows 
itself as a material thing done of bone, nerves, tendons and flesh and the 
former disappears from the foreground “to reveal the external object in 
its place” (105). the reversibility between both roles gives rise to a kind of 
reflection which differentiates the touching hand from the touched one as a 
part of my living body in the exercise of its power of perceiving and acting 
in the world (merleau-Ponty 1960, 166). When my passive hand attends the 
contact with the active one and anticipates its role, there is no difference 
from shaking the hand of another person or only seeing it, because i recog-
nize both my living body and the other’s one by virtue of an intercorporeal 
compresence (170-171). the self-othering dialectics disclosed by the phe-
nomenon of double touch anticipates the way another subject experiences 
my lived body. bodily awareness is thus affected from its very beginning by 
the reference to otherness and constitutes a precondition for empathy and 
the recognition of other persons as embodied subjects (thompson 2005, 413). 
more explicitly than husserl, merleau-Ponty insists on the mutual permea-
tion between ownership and otherness in the constitution of living body. ac-
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cording to Slatman (2009, 334) husserl can trace a sharp distinction between 
the sensing embodied subject and its thing-like materiality only because he 
has conceived of touch as an isolated sensory modality and has stressed the 
role of sensings in the genesis of bodily self-awareness only as concerns the 
isolated subject in its indexical “here”. For merleau-Ponty on the contrary 
there is no substantial difference between touch and sight as regards the 
possibility of (not) constituting the living body and there is no reason to 
ascribe to sensings any particular role in generating bodily ownership, be-
cause the self-attribution of a bodily part presupposes already the identifi-
cation of the subject with a lived body that is already “there” (carman 1999, 
222). the relation between touching and touched is not to be interpreted 
in the sense of a coincidence but as a gap that can be filled neither by con-
sciousness nor by the body itself. This difference points out to the flesh as an 
ontological mixed genus which grounds on the one hand the coexistence of 
lived body and material body, on the other the reciprocal belonging of the 
embodied subject and the world (merleau-Ponty 1964, 254-257).
as a tentative conclusion i will try here to foreshadow a comparison be-
tween husserl’s and merleau-Ponty’s contrasting positions about the role 
of tactility in the constitution of leib. In the first place Husserl seems more 
attentive than merleau-Ponty to highlight the gradual constitution of the 
experience of the own body in its different layers of sense through the 
conceptual tools offered by his regressive analysis. in this way husserl can 
succeed in identifying in the localized sensations and in the corresponding 
kinaesthesias the minimal conditions for bodily self-awareness and inten-
tionality. the gestaltic holism which characterizes merleau-Ponty’s philoso-
phy of body is incompatible with husserl’s analytic-regressive approach, 
since the former recognizes in the leib an always already given and consti-
tuted structure without any concern for its genesis. For this ground hus-
serl’s approach is more suitable than merleau-Ponty’s one in order to obtain 
a rigorous description of bodily self-awareness as concerns the possibility of 
grounding a neurophysiologic investigation of its conditions of realization 
(Petit 2006). Secondly, merleau-Ponty muddles up the different components 
of bodily awareness whereas husserl tries to keep them distinct. the cat-
egory of flesh as mixed genus blurs every distinction between lived body 
and material body on the one side, proper body and other body on the other. 
on the contrary husserl can keep these differences by pointing out the inte-
grating function of the palpating hands. taking an object in hand sanctions 
its belonging to the system of leib as its extension, while the mutual touch 
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of both hands leads to an operation of self-constitution which enables by 
means of the localized sensations the transition from the perception of the 
body as object to the perception of the body as sensing and acting subject. 
thirdly, in spite of the usual contraposition between merleau-Ponty’s ap-
parent emphasis on intracorporeality and husserl’s solipsism, husserl takes 
into account the circumstance that the single subject has only a partial and 
limited perspective on his own body and that its complete apprehension 
implies the constitution of intersubjectivity which is accomplished only 
at a further stage. this happens through an emphatic apperception which 
exploits the same tactile localized sensations that drive the constitution of 
lived body at the level of the solipsistic subject, by transposing them ana-
logically on the other’s body. “the full appreciation of others as persons like 
us depends upon the involvement of body-related first-person tactile expe-
riential knowledge” (gallese 2005, 40). this suggests that husserl is right in 
maintaining that the own lived body is not primarily constituted by alter-
ity, which plays an integrating role and makes up a further layer of sense in 
comparison to the solipsistic constitution.
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